Research 

Publications:

"Integration and Return Intentions Among Displaced Individuals" [International Migration, 2026]

Despite structural support, integration remains challenging for most internally displaced people (IDPs). My survey shows that over 50% feel only partially integrated, and 65% report a lack of belonging. Broader integration measures similarly indicate low integration, comparable to that of refugees in the U.S. 

Interestingly, none of the integration metrics explain the desire to return, suggesting that even integrated individuals may wish to return. In fact, 90% of Georgian IDPs express a wish to return, primarily due to emotional factors, while economic reasons influence those wishing to stay.  This research adds to the literature, which often links reluctance to return to economic concerns but overlooks motivations behind the desire to return. 

Given the importance of emotional attachments, peace treaties should include chapters on allowing displaced populations to access sacred places. Additionally, the paper calls for the development of integration measures tailored specifically to the unique needs of IDPs.

Working Papers:

"Politics of Non Democracies: Fraud, Post-Election Boycotts, and Protests" (with Mate Malashkhia) [Under Review]

Non-democracies are often characterized by electoral manipulation and contested results. Despite a growing literature on these regimes, opposition strategies remain underexplored. To address this gap, we develop a formal model analyzing the interactions among the incumbent’s, the opposition’s, and the citizens’ decisions. We show that a boycott — forfeiting parliamentary seats — can serve as a powerful signal of the opposition’s ability, thereby mobilizing large-scale protests.  This new information explains why citizens may support the regime one day but protest the next. Thus, in contexts where the opposition faces public outreach constraints, a post-election boycott becomes one of the few available and effective strategies. Given the boycott’s significance, we explore the factors that influence this decision.

Moreover, our model offers a new perspective  on the strategic role of fraud — shaping post-election dynamics. Additionally, we argue that  peaceful transitions arise when credible threats of protests are coupled with parliamentary elections. 

• Conferences: WPSA 2025, MPSA 2025, Democracy and Development in the Global South Conference 2024, MPSA 2023.

"How Does Forced Displacement Affect Gendered Differences?" [Under Review]

Forced displacement reshapes lives and social relations. This paper examines the gendered consequences of displacement using original survey data. By comparing internally displaced people with nearby non-displaced respondents, I assess whether displacement reshapes gender inequalities. In contrast to findings from some refugee studies, I show that displacement does not uniformly worsen women’s disadvantage. Women are less likely than men to be employed in both populations, yet the gender employment gap is smaller among IDPs. Women also report worse mental health, but this gender gap is not larger among IDPs than among non-displaced respondents. Moreover, I find little evidence that displaced women are less socially integrated than displaced men. Yet, displaced women are less willing to return to their place of origin and, among those willing to return, are less certain about doing so. Common explanations receive limited support; the pattern is consistent with men’s stronger political attachment to territorial recovery.

• Conferences: MPSA 2026.

"The Effect of Forced Displacement on Political Attitudes" (with Mate Malashkhia)  [Under Review]

War affects lives long after it ends. While much research focuses on violence, the effects of displacement remain underexplored despite more than 120 million people living in forced displacement worldwide. Using a natural experiment setting created by the unexpected postwar shift in the Administrative Boundary Line after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, we examine forced displacement as one of the most widespread forms of wartime victimization and argue that it has lasting effects on political attitudes. Similar to findings from the violence literature, displacement generates perpetrator-directed hostility without affecting broader foreign policy preferences. This suggests that political effects commonly associated with violence exposure may not be unique to violence, but instead reflect a broader process through which wartime victimization shapes postwar political attitudes. At the same time, when displacement is accompanied by violence, it is associated with greater support toward analogous victims and higher reported voting. Thus, displacement and violence can reinforce each other in specific domains.

• Conferences: PolMeth Europe 2026, MEA 2026, 2025 Econometric Society European Winter Meeting and Junior Scholars in Quantitative Conflict Workshop 2025.

"The Protest Dilemma: The Effect of Threat of War in Sustaining Non-Democratic Regimes" (with Mate Malashkhia) 

In non-democratic regimes protests serve as the primary means of voicing political discontent. While a growing literature examines protests, the role of external factors remains underexplored. To fill this gap, we develop a formal model of how the enemy’s war decision and the incumbent’s use of propaganda influence citizens’ protest choices. We show that even when the incumbent is undesirable, the threat of war deters mobilization, offering a novel explanation for why grievances do not always translate into protest. Thus, protest outcomes depend critically on the circumstances faced by the enemy. Citizen mobilization under such conditions also hinges on the opposition being perceived as significantly more capable than the incumbent. Finally, when the adversary is more likely to invade if the opposition is expected to come to power, heightened war threat through propaganda can sometimes paradoxically fuel mobilization. Thus, propaganda is not a universally effective tool for protest suppression.

• Conferences: Comparative Politics and Formal Theory 2025 and APSA 2025.

"How does Housing Affect Integration Outcomes for Internally Displaced People?" 

In recent years, a record number of people have been forcibly displaced. This paper utilizes a natural experiment to examine a case that isolates the effect of housing in a context free from cultural confounders. I find that internally displaced people (IDPs) living in settlements primarily composed of other IDPs report a greater sense of belonging and are more likely to experience post-traumatic growth. Conversely, despite facing challenges in mixed neighborhoods, IDPs in these areas tend to rate government performance more positively and believe their needs are being met. A possible explanation is that IDPs in isolated neighborhoods are less reliant on state institutions for governance and support.

The findings highlight the crucial role that international organizations can play in shaping effective housing policies for internally displaced persons (IDPs). The lack of international protection leaves these populations vulnerable to government discretion, which may jeopardize their welfare due to electoral motivations.

• Conferences: APSA 2025.

Work in Progress:

"Leading to the Revolution: Signaling Dissent through Illicit Activities" (with Mate Malashkhia) 

Citizens in non-democracies often express dissatisfaction through underground actions before turning to open protest. We study participation in the shadow economy as both an economic choice and a political signal. Citizens who view the regime as extractive or illegitimate are more willing to leave the formal economy, so the scale of informal activity contains information about otherwise hidden anti-regime sentiment. The ruler must therefore decide whether to monitor and suppress this activity. Enforcement increases state revenue, but it can also generate public information about the extent of informal activity, making widespread dissatisfaction more visible and facilitating protest. The model shows that monitoring is most attractive to regimes of ex-ante intermediate strength. Very strong regimes have relatively little informal activity to suppress, whereas very weak regimes may not survive long enough to benefit from the recovered revenue and face even greater political risk from revealing the level of dissent. Dictators may therefore tolerate a large shadow economy because efforts to suppress it can threaten their political survival. 

• Conferences: MEA 2026, Politics and Political Economy of Eurasia Workshop 2026 and MPSA 2024.

"Collateral Gains: Forced Displacement, Gender Norms, and Labor Markets in Post-Conflict Timor-Leste" (with Francesco Cenerini)

"External Threats and Criminal Governance: A Theory of Mafia–State Relations"