Job Market Papers:
"Politics of Non Democracies: Fraud, Post-Election Boycotts, and Protests" (with Mate Malashkhia) [R&R at APSR]
Non-democracies are often characterized by electoral manipulation and contested results. Despite a growing literature on these regimes, opposition strategies remain underexplored. To address this gap, we develop a formal model analyzing the interactions between the incumbent, the opposition, and the citizens' protest decisions. In contexts where the opposition faces public outreach constraints, a post-election boycott – forfeiting parliamentary seats – acts as a powerful signal of the opposition's strength, thereby mobilizing large-scale protests. This new information about the opposition's ability explains why citizens express support for the regime one day but protest the next.
Moreover, our model offers a new perspective on the strategic role of fraud – shaping post-election dynamics. Additionally, we demonstrate that peaceful transitions are driven by a combination of a credible threat of protests and the country holding parliamentary elections. Lastly, we analyze the role of international support to the opposition, showing that it can sometimes backfire.
WPSA 2025, MPSA 2025, and DDGS 2024.
"How does Housing Affect Integration Outcomes for Internally Displaced People?" [Scheduled: APSA 2025]
In recent years, a record number of people have been forcibly displaced. This paper utilizes a natural experiment to examine a case that isolates the effect of housing in a context free from cultural confounders. I find that internally displaced people (IDPs) living in settlements primarily composed of other IDPs report a greater sense of belonging and are more likely to experience post-traumatic growth. Conversely, despite facing challenges in mixed neighborhoods, IDPs in these areas tend to rate government performance more positively and believe their needs are being met. A possible explanation is that IDPs in isolated neighborhoods are less reliant on state institutions for governance and support.
The findings highlight the crucial role that international organizations can play in shaping effective housing policies for internally displaced persons (IDPs). The lack of international protection leaves these populations vulnerable to government discretion, which may jeopardize their welfare due to electoral motivations.
Working Papers:
"Integration and Return Intentions Among Displaced Individuals" [PDF available upon request] [Under review]
Despite structural support, integration remains challenging for most internally displaced people (IDPs). My survey shows that over 50% feel only partially integrated, and 65% report a lack of belonging. Broader integration measures similarly indicate low integration, comparable to that of refugees in the U.S.
Interestingly, none of the integration metrics explain the desire to return, suggesting that even integrated individuals may wish to return. In fact, 90% of Georgian IDPs express a wish to return, primarily due to emotional factors, while economic reasons influence those wishing to stay. This research adds to the literature, which often links reluctance to return to economic concerns but overlooks motivations behind the desire to return.
Given the importance of emotional attachments, peace treaties should include chapters on allowing displaced populations to access sacred places. Additionally, the paper calls for the development of integration measures tailored specifically to the unique needs of IDPs.
"The Protest Dilemma: How the Threat of War Sustains Non-Democratic Regimes" (with Mate Malashkhia) [Scheduled: APSA 2025 and Comparative Politics and Formal Theory Conference]
In non-democracies, where citizens rely on elections to achieve regime change, protests become a fundamental aspect of the political process. While there is a growing body of literature on the factors influencing the decision to protest, the role of external factors, such as threat of war, remains unexplored. This gap is particularly significant given that many non-democratic regimes operate under the persistent threat of invasion.
In this paper, we propose a formal model that examines the interconnection between an enemy’s decision to invade, citizens’ decision to protest, and the incumbent’s hold on power. Citizens face a strategic trade-off: while protests can potentially lead to regime change and better government, they also create domestic instability, increasing the likelihood of a successful invasion by the enemy. Thus, the enemy can exploit protests strategically in deciding when and whether to invade. As a result, protests, instead of leading to better governance, may ultimately result in the country’s occupation. Our findings reveal that citizens’ decisions to protest against a bad government are influenced by the strength of the enemy. When the enemy is strong—meaning the cost of invasion is low—protests become highly risky, deterring citizens from challenging the incompetent incumbent. Conversely, when the enemy is weak, citizens can coordinate and successfully replace the bad incumbent. Moreover, as the threat of invasion discourages protest, bad incumbents benefit by retaining power. Furthermore, incumbents may leverage this threat strategically when determining the level of public good to provide. Specifically, under the threat of war, incumbents reduce public good provision while increasing their private rents.
This paper makes a novel contribution by illustrating how the development of non-democracies is shaped by both internal and external factors. Specifically, our model demonstrates how a country’s development is influenced by the strength of its enemy. Moreover, we identify the conditions under which countries facing persistent risks of invasion become trapped in poor political and economic conditions, as well as the circumstances that allow them to overcome this trap.
"The Effect of Internal Displacement on Political Attitudes" [Junior Scholars in Quantitative Conflict Workshop]
How does war affect political attitudes? While much research on war centers on violence, the effects of displacement remain underexplored, despite over 120 million people being forcibly displaced. This omission is significant, as displacement represents a unique form of victimization with long-lasting impacts. I address this gap by examining Georgians displaced by the 2008 Russian invasion. Using a natural experiment, I find that while displaced and non-displaced individuals demonstrate similar levels of support for Georgia joining NATO and the EU, displaced individuals are more likely to hold hawkish attitudes when questions are directed at those responsible for their displacement - in this case, Russia. However, displaced individuals, particularly those who have experienced violence, exhibit a heightened sense of solidarity with others who have endured similar hardships, namely with Ukrainians. In a world increasingly shaped by forced migration, understanding how displacement influences political preferences, fosters solidarity, and affects trust in institutions to mediate conflicts is critically important.
"Gender Gap in Socio-Economic Outcomes and Willingness to Return for the Internally Displaced People"
In a survey of IDPs in Georgia, the data reveal that women face significantly more challenges in their host environment than men. In particular, they fall behind men on the economic component of integration and they do not seem to gain economic autonomy in displacement. Furthermore, displaced women fare worse on measures of mental health. While the literature points to female success on growth after trauma, in this case, it is no more rapid than for men. Given these travails as experienced by women IDPs in their host communities, it is a surprise that they are far less willing to return to their home villages. The data offer clues for this reluctance – women IDPs are more likely to believe that everything in life is determined by fate. Perhaps women feel a loss of agency, which inhibits their ability to take positive action in return to their home village. Another reason why men are significantly more willing to return might be that displacement is more traumatic for men, as relative to women, men's mental health suffers more, if they become displaced.
"How did the Russo-Ukraine War Affect Party Identification in the US?" (with Mate Malashkhia) [MPSA 2025 and APSA 2025]
Per the "Almond-Lippmann consensus", the public is uninformed, has incoherent opinion on foreign policy and is irrelevant to decision making. However, after addressing the endogeneity issue, we find that support for Ukraine has a strong negative effect on identifying as a Republican. Moreover, the support for Ukraine, a foreign policy issue, has a larger effect than the variables consistently found in the literature to have a large and significant effect on party identification. As for identifying as a Democrat, the results from the probit model show that when other, potentially exogenous, variables are included as controls, the support for Ukraine has a strong, significant, and positive effect. However, when we add other, possibly endogenous variables, the effect disappears.
The strong negative effect of Ukraine support on identifying as a Republican contradicts most of the existing work that foreign policy is a low salience issue.
Work in Progress:
"Why Boycott the Parliament?" [MPSA 2023]
Non-democratic regimes pose a puzzle for scholars as to why rulers choose to hold elections, how rulers will conduct elections, or why and how the opposition participates. How free or fair will the elections be? Why and when will opposition parties participate in elections? And if they participate, when will they accept the results versus when will they boycott? Most of the work on opposition participation in non-democracies has analyzed why the opposition refuses to contest elections. What has been overlooked, however, is the opposition’s decision about whether to accept the results or stage a boycott. Yet, parliamentary boycotts are quite common, especially in post- Soviet countries. Out of a total of 91 elections held in 12 post-Soviet countries, 17 were followed by a Parliament boycott (18.5% boycott rate). Moreover, looking at countries where boycotts happened at least once, the rate of parliamentary boycotts is around 32%.
In this paper I develop a formal model explaining when the government will commit low versus high levels of electoral fraud and how the opposition will respond - will they accept the results, or will they boycott the parliament? Using case studies from post-Soviet countries, I explain why some elections were followed by a Parliamentary boycott while others were not.
"Leading to the Revolution: Resistance to the Soviet Rule" [MPSA 2024]
How do revolutions happen? I develop a theory on how citizens gauge each other's anti-regime sentiments through participation in illicit activities, such as black markets. These activities are partially observable to the government, which seeks to suppress them to reassert control. However, repression inadvertently heightens public awareness of dissent, making shared opposition more apparent.
I analyze this theory by process tracing the collapse of the USSR. Specifically, focusing on Georgia, I show that participation in black markets and parallel, shadow institutions was widely recognized and perceived as nationalist resistance by both Moscow and Georgian citizens. As the USSR's state capacity declined, this shared understanding of dissent enabled citizens to anticipate mass participation, ultimately driving Georgia’s exit from the Soviet Union.